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It is often taken for granted that our desires can contribute to what
it is rational for us to do. This paper examines an account of desire
that promises an explanation of this datum, the guise of the good. I ar-
gue that extant guise-of-the-good accounts fail to provide an adequate
explanation of how a class of desires—basic desire—contribute to prac-
tical rationality. I develop an alternative guise-of-the-good account on
which basic desires attune us to our reasons for action in virtue of
their biological function. This account emphasises the role of desire as
part of our competence to recognise and respond to normative reasons.
Keywords: Desire, Rationality, Practical Rationality, Evaluative Judge-
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1 Introduction
Many of our desires spontaneously arise without prior decision or delibera-
tion. Such desires can contribute to what it is rational for one to do. Take,
for instance, a desire to go for a stroll, a desire to eat a sweet snack, or a
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desire to hug a loved one. There is a distinctive kind of influence that such
desires exert from the perspective of the agent. Other things being equal, it
is natural to hold that these desires can rationalise corresponding intentions
and actions.
However, an explanation of how such desires can rationalise actions re-
mains elusive. This paper examines a pedigreed approach to explaining
this datum— the ‘guise of the good’— according to which desire involves a
representation of its objects as, in some sense, normatively favoured.
The plan is as follows. Section 2 clarifies the notion of desire and prac-
tical rationality at issue, and further substantiates the intuition of rational
significance. Section 3 argues that extant guise-of-the-good accounts fail
to accommodate a particular class of desire or provide a satisfactory ex-
planation of their rational significance. Section 4 develops an alternative
explanation within the spirit of the guise of the good. This account appeals
to the biological function of such desires and motivates the view that they
comprise an important part of our capacity to respond to normative reasons
for action. I argue that this account evades the problems I identified for its
rivals.
2 The Rational Significance of Desire
Two preliminary clarifications are needed. The first concerns the relevant
notion of desire at issue. I distinguish between pro-attitudes and desires
and isolate several marks of the class of desire that will be our focus. The
second concerns the relevant notion of rationality at work and clarifies the
intuition concerning desire’s rational significance.
2.1 Desire
In its broadest sense, the term ‘desire’ is used generically to denote any
motivational state; it is synonymous with a dominant usage of the term
‘pro-attitude’. This category includes a wide range of mental states including
intentions, hopes, wishes as well as transient psychological episodes like a
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passing urge, or a wave of anger or fear. Arguably, beliefs or judgments
about what is good or valuable would qualify as desires.
However, ‘desire’ can also be used more narrowly to denote a proper sub-
set of pro-attitudes (for example, ‘desires proper’ in Schueler (1995). For
clarity, I reserve the term ‘desire’ for this subset of pro-attitudes. Philoso-
phers disagree over which features or functional role a pro-attitude must
possess to count as a desire. Some claim that desires are pro-attitudes
that play a role in the production of rational goal-directed behaviour (Stal-
naker, 1984; Smith, 1994) or behaviour sensitive to reward-based learning
(Schroeder, 2004). Others isolate affective phenomenology as essential to
desires (Strawson, 1994). For the present purposes, I stay neutral on this
issue by accepting a substantial degree of heterogeneity within the class
of desire (cf. Schroeder, 2004, p. 162). We can then frame the operative
question as follows:
Q1. which desires are rationally significant, and in virtue of what are those
desires rationally significant?
Many working on this issue assume that there is a unique feature that
explains the rational significance of every desire. However, we should not
foreclose on the possibility that multiple features jointly provide different ex-
planations of why distinct subsets of desire are rationally significant. Whilst
extant guise-of-the-good accounts are successful in explaining why some de-
sires can rationalise action, I argue here that these explanations fail to gen-
eralise to a particular class of desires that I call basic desires.
To fasten upon basic desires, consider some canonical examples, for ex-
ample, paradigmatically appetitive desires like the desire to eat when hungry
or drink when thirsty. Closely related are desires connected to bodily needs,
though with more specific contents; for instance, the desire for foods with
particular flavours or appearances. Other basic desires are not necessarily
tied to homeostatic needs; for instance, sexual desires. However, not all
basic desires have objects related to biological function fulfilment. Humans
are capable of developing more idiosyncratic basic desires ontogenetically;
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for instance, desires to accumulate money, to consume drugs, to visit Mars,
etc.
Reference to the objects of basic desire can only take us so far. A more
promising strategy will be to highlight several criterial features or ‘marks’ of
basic desires. Without loss of generality, I consider a paradigmatic appetitive
desire to eat something sweet.
1. Basic desires take two forms, standing and occurrent. Standing ba-
sic desires are dispositional states. A standing basic desire to eat
something sweet is a dispositional state that we colloquially describe
as having a ‘sweet tooth’. Specifically, it is a disposition to undergo
a psychological event or process with characteristic phenomenology
(more in section 4) under certain triggering conditions. This transient
episode is the corresponding occurrent form of the basic desire to eat
something sweet.
2. Basic desires are a proper subset of intrinsic desires. As standardly
formulated, the objects of intrinsic desires are wanted ‘for their own
sake’ (Schroeder, 2004, p. 5). In contrast, the objects of instrumental
desires are wanted as a means to some desired end. This distinction
means that basic desires cannot be demarcated simply at the level of
content. The motivational state that we can accurately describe as a
desire for something sweet could be instrumental if it is a desire to eat
something sweet because it would serve some other desired end.1
3. Discussions of basic desire in occurrent form often focus on their dis-
tinctive etiology which is non-volitive, that is, that they are not the
product of our agency. A basic desire to eat something sweet arises
not as a result of a ‘decision or deliberation’, but ‘simply assail[s] us’
(Nagel, 1970, p. 29) or ‘come[s] upon us’ (Schafer, 2013, p. 260) under
certain conditions.
1My reason for saying that basic desires are a proper subset of intrinsic desires is that
there can be intrinsic desires that do not exhibit a further characteristic feature that I
discuss in section 3.2.1: the possibility of their being recalcitrant to normative judgement.
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4. When occurrent basic desires spontaneously arise, there is a phe-
nomenologically familiar sense in which such desires are motivational.
When they strike, such desires spur us to act. Philosophers have de-
scribed this aspect by calling occurrent desires ‘action-oriented’ Schapiro,
2009, p. 230.
I stress that features (1 – 4) are characteristic features to help us latch
on to the kinds of states of interest. Ultimately, the category of basic desire
will be demarcated etiologically by appeal to underlying mechanisms that
generate them (section 4). For now, I want to turn to the question of the
sense in which such desires can contribute to what it is rational for one to
do.
2.2 Rational Significance
In what sense are desires rationally significant? A reasonable starting point
is that evaluations of practical rationality are concerned with whether an
agent’s responses make sense relative to her perspective. In this respect, ra-
tionality is distinguished from correctness, where an agent A’s responding
in way φ in circumstance c is correct if and only if the total balance of
normative reasons favour A’s φ-ing in c. An action that is correct in this
sense is one that we objectively ought to perform: objective oughts are ‘deci-
sive reason-implying’ (Parfit, 2011, p. 33). To illustrate how rationality and
correctness diverge, consider cases where an agent has a partial or mistaken
epistemic state. Suppose that A falsely believes that amber liquid before her
is beer when it is instead gasoline (Williams, 1979). A’s rationality cannot
be impugned if she were to act on her desire for beer by taking a sip of the
gasoline even though it is not the correct thing to do. There is an intuitive
sense in which taking a sip of the liquid would be rational to do given her
mistaken belief that doing so would quench her thirst.
Even distinguishing rationality from correctness, there remains contro-
versy about whether rationality requires responsiveness to apparent reasons
(Sylvan, 2014; Alvarez, 2018; Lord, 2018) or whether it is entirely a matter
of compliance with certain ‘structural’ requirements governing combinations
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of attitudes (Broome, 2013). Given this controversy, I will avoid foreclos-
ing on which notion of rationality is relevant to understanding the rational
significance of desire.
Finally, it is important not to draw an overly strong conclusion from
the kinds of cases considered at the outset. Suppose that one is deciding
whether to have a salty or sweet snack when an occurrent desire for the
sweet option strikes. Such a desire may not rationalise all things considered;
for example, if one were also to learn of a serious health issue, or if one had
stronger competing desires. So whilst a basic desire to φ may rationalise
φ-ing, it does so defeasibly, absent countervailing conditions.
3 Desire and the Guise of the Good
This section considers accounts that explain desires’ rational significance by
appeal to desires’ objects’ being under the guise of the good. I begin by clar-
ifying the core commitment of guise-of-the-good accounts of desire. I then
outline two formulations of the view, arguing that they fail to accommodate
the kinds of desires discussed in section 2.1.
3.1 The Basics
The guise of the good can be understood as a broad thesis about the nature
of rational agency as such, or as a narrower thesis about desires and their
influence on rational agents. The broad thesis claims that what distinguishes
the intentional actions of rational agents is that they are the product of what
the subject takes to be, in some respect, normatively favoured. This thesis
articulates a ‘formal’ constraint on rational agency (Boyle and Lavin, 2010).
I will focus instead on narrower versions of the guise of the good as concerned
with the nature of desires. According to this thesis, desire constitutively
involves representing its object as normatively favoured in some respect.2
We may unpack this idea with two questions:
2For discussions of guise-of-the-good theories of desire, see Stampe (1987), Hawkins
(2008), Schapiro (2009), Schafer (2013) and Gregory (2016).
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Q2. In what way does desire represent its objects as normatively favoured?
Q3. What is the notion of normative favouring involved?
The literature centres on two main answers to (Q2). We need to clarify
which representational state we look to in the theoretical domain as our
model of desire. The two main contenders are belief and perception, both
arguably states that involve representing the world to be a certain way. Cut-
ting across this distinction is whether we think of the relevant representation
as having a normative content. According to content-based formulations, a
desire to φ represents the act-type φ as normatively favoured by being a rep-
resentational state with the content that φ-ing is F, where F is the notion
of normative favouring settled by (Q3). The alternative is an attitude-based
formulation, typically glossed by its proponents as the claim that a desire to
φ consists of a certain kind of attitude– representing-as-F– that the subject
stands in to the content φ (Tenenbaum, 2007; Tenenbaum, 2008; Schafer,
2013; for discussion, see Schroeder, 2008).
Several answers to (Q3) are available. Scholastic formulations focussed
on goodness as the relevant way in which desire represents its objects as
normatively favoured. However, the threat of seeming counterexamples in-
volving cases of bad, evil, or whimsical desires has motivated the rise of
alternatives that construe the relevant representation as one involving deon-
tic contents (Schafer, 2013) or contents about normative reasons (Gregory,
2013; Gregory, 2016; Gregory, 2018). This paper will not arbitrate between
these answers to (Q3) and the negative portion of this paper will be general
enough to cover any variation in how we understand ‘normative favouring’.
Now that we have a sense of the various theoretical possibilities, we can
consider concrete examples of guise-of-the-good accounts of desire in the
literature that aim to explain how desires rationalise action.
3.2 Desire as Belief about Reasons
In a series of recent papers, Alex Gregory argues that desire is belief about
normative reasons (Gregory, 2013; Gregory, 2016; Gregory, 2018):
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Desire as Belief with Normative Content (DAB) ‘To desire to φ is
to believe that you have normative reason to φ.’ (Gregory, 2016,
p. 201).
Gregory explains the rational significance of desire by appeal to the prin-
ciple that rationality requires responsiveness to one’s de dicto normative
beliefs (beliefs with normative content). This requirement of rationality is
typically captured by what is called an ‘enkratic’ principle (Broome, 2013),
which Gregory formulates as the claim that ‘[r]ationality favours φ-ing to
the extent that you believe you have reason to φ.’ (Gregory, 2018, p. 1072).
Given DAB’s identification of desire with normative belief, we can explain
why desiring to φ can rationalise one’s φ-ing in terms of the fact that ra-
tionality favours, to some degree, your φ-ing if you believe that you have
reason to φ.
Whilst this account might well apply to some desires– there is, after all,
a broad sense of ‘desire’ that might include normative beliefs– I will argue
that the account is implausible when considering basic desires. Without loss
of generality, I will take as an illustrative example the typical desire to eat
some chocolate.
3.2.1 Problem 1: Basic Desires Aren’t Normative Beliefs
Many philosophers have questioned whether desire necessarily involves nor-
mative beliefs. Some focus their critical attention on issues concerning the
preconditions for concept possession (Velleman, 1992; Hawkins, 2008). How-
ever, the characteristic way that occurrent basic desires may be recalcitrant
to normative judgement can establish this without weighing in on controver-
sial issues about the thresholds for concept possession. Take, for instance,
a desire to eat chocolate whilst on a diet. However, for such cases to be
counterexamples to DAB, they must be controlled to ensure that the sub-
ject genuinely lacks any belief that she has a reason to eat chocolate as
opposed to such a belief’s rational force being outweighed by other reasons
(e.g. transient pleasure-based reasons). I offer:
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Chocolate Cake: At time t1, Tom, a lover of chocolate and
is presented with a cake. What strikes him is the cake’s lavish
chocolate coating with the sponge looking rather dry. Tom is
struck by an occurrent desire to eat a slice of cake. At t2, a
scientist alters Tom to induce a painful reaction upon contact
with the chocolate that would instantaneously neutralise any
pleasure response. On the reliable scientist’s testimony, Tom
comes to believe that the fact the cake is coated with chocolate
now counts against eating it. Nevertheless, looking at the cake’s
chocolate coating, he still feels inclined to eat the cake.
It is relatively uncontroversial that a rational subject’s beliefs are reg-
ulated by her take on the evidence for or against the truth of the belief
(see Scanlon, 1998, p. 20 on ‘judgement-sensitivity’). So after the scientist’s
intervention, Tom’s subsequent judgement that the only apparent good-
making feature of the cake now counts decisively against eating it should
lead him to abandon the belief. This entails abandoning the desire if DAB
is true. So normative beliefs are not a necessary part of the kind of desire
Tom continues to possess.
Gregory (2016) considers a similar counterexample involving a heroin ad-
dict who wants to shoot up but believes that she has no reason to. Gregory
responds that to the extent that this conative state is not reasons-responsive,
it is not a desire but a ‘primitive compulsion or drive’ (Gregory, 2016, p. 210).
There is a danger of special pleading against those who think that Choco-
late Cake constitutes a counterexample. Gregory should not deny that the
appetitive inclination Tom feels is a desire simply because it is recalcitrant
to countervailing normative judgement. Moreover, it is dubious whether re-
flection on addiction cases can be of any help. It is far from obvious that
addictions are not kinds of desires; indeed, some accounts of states of addic-
tion involve abnormally powerful desires (Holton and Berridge, 2016). Nor
is it necessary to think that Tom has an addiction to chocolate with the host
of exaggerated properties of addictive states.
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3.2.2 Problem 2: DAB Over-intellectualises Rational Support
This section argues that Gregory’s explanation of how desires rationally
support action is objectionably over-intellectualised.
Notice that on Gregory’s explanation, it is not the apparent reason that
one believes oneself to possess, but the content that those considerations are
reasons, that does the rationalising. The problem is that this makes it a
necessary condition on desire’s having the power to rationally support ac-
tion that the subject possesses the capacity to form beliefs about normative
reasons. I take this to be an unattractive consequence of the view because
it introduces an unmotivated gulf between the desires of subjects with the
sophisticated capacity to form normative beliefs and those of subjects with-
out this capacity. Many of the intuitions that led us to think that desires
can rationally support action apply just as naturally to children without the
capacity to think about justificatory reasons. Take young Uma who forms
an occurrent desire for the ice cream at the restaurant. It seems unmoti-
vated to hold that such desires have the power to rationalise the choice of ice
cream in a conceptually mature subject yet deny Uma’s desires that same
power.
3.3 Desire and the Perceptual Analogy
This section evaluates guise-of-the-good accounts of desire that model the
representational state in question on perception. The turn to perception is
motivated by the promise of explaining how desire may be recalcitrant to
normative belief on the model of how it may perceptually appear to one
that p even if one believes that not-p (under the Müller-Lyer illusion, for
example).
Two formulations of this view are discussed, content-based and attitude-
based. I argue that the content-based variant faces a similar problem to




According to the content-based variant:
Desire as Perception, Content-Based (DPC) to desire to φ is for it
to appear to one that some property F or consideration C pertaining
to one’s φ-ing is a reason for one to φ.
Arguably, the account of unmotivated desire given in Scanlon (1998) is
a version of (DPC).3 According to Scanlon, such desires involve dispositions
for one’s attention to be ‘directed insistently toward considerations that
present themselves as counting in favor of P’ [ibid.: 39]. Scanlon claims to
be able to accommodate the possibility of recalcitrance which is analysed
as involving a ‘strong and recurrent tendency to see something as a reason’
contrary to a ‘firm considered opinion. . . that it is not such a reason’ [ibid.:
40].
For this reason, I focus on extending the second objection I raised for
DAB concerning its over-intellectualised explanation of how desires ratio-
nalise action. For it to quasi-perceptually appear to one that a considera-
tion is a reason for action, one must exercise the concept of a reason. So,
to the extent that desires rationalise in virtue of consisting of a perception
with normative content that one then endorses, only the desires of those
who possess the concept of a normative reason have the power to rationalise
action. This introduces an unmotivated gulf between subjects who possess
and those who lack the concept of a normative reason, despite the initial
intuitions about desire’s rational significance seeming to apply equally to
both types of subjects.
3.3.2 Attitude-Based Perceptualism
Those who wish to pursue the perceptual model would do well to avoid
content-based formulations. I will consider two recent attempts to develop
what I have called ‘attitude-based’ formulations.
3Scanlon glosses the desire to buy a new computer as ‘ha[ving] clear normative con-
tent . . . that I have reason to buy a new computer ’ [Scanlon 1998: 43. Italics mine].
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Schafer (2013) argues that a content-based formulation breaks the anal-
ogy with perception. When a perception that p rationalises a corresponding
belief, one does not perceive that it is true that p. Analogously, a de-
sire to φ rationalises an intention to φ not by presenting the content that
φ-ing is good/ought to be done/etc. Instead, there is a ‘manner in which [de-
sires] present their content to the subject’, their ‘imperatival’ Fregean ‘force’
[ibid.: 270] which presents courses of action as ‘something [one] ought to do’
[ibid.: 275]. On Schafer’s view, desires rationalise intentions because desires
‘[have] the same force and content as an intention to [φ]’ [ibid.: 276. Ital-
ics mine]. An intention to φ is ‘simply an endorsement of the way [desire]
already presents [φ-ing] to the subject’ [ibid.: 275. Italics mine]. Similarly,
Tenenbaum [2008] appeals to the idea that desires are ‘prima facie’ attitudes
involving ‘an inclination to hold a certain content good’ [ibid.: 135]. The
rational transition from desire to intention is one of endorsing a prima facie
attitude in forming an ‘all-out’ attitude, intention. By making the relevant
normative property part of the relation that the subject stands in to the con-
tent in question, we neatly evade the problem of over-intellectualising our
explanation of how desires rationalise action (cf. Schroeder, 2008, p. 123).
The central problem for extant versions of the Attitude View is that they
are too underdeveloped to provide a satisfactory explanation of how desires
rationalise intention and action. The issue centres on the attitudinal relation
that carries almost all of the explanatory weight, the notion of ‘imperatival
force’ (Schafer) or inclinations to ‘hold as good’ (Tenenbaum). What exactly
is this good/ought-involving relation?
Tenenbaum (2008) suggests that the relation is not merely any relation
for which goodness is a correctness condition [ibid.: 133–4]. Rather, it is
constitutively connected with goodness. Tenenbaum asks us to consider
Moore-paradoxical assertions of the form ‘I believe that p, but it is not true
that p’ which are paradoxical. This suggests that ‘truth is not just a norm
of correctness for belief, but that believing p involves holding p to be true.’
[ibid.: 133–4. Italics mine]. Tenenbaum extends this thought to desire,
claiming that desires involve holding acts/outcomes to be good.
Yet, for all Schafer and Tenenbaum say, this still leaves us without an
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account of the relation expressed by placeholder constructions like ‘holding
to be good’ or ‘presenting as ought to be done’. To draw out this point,
we can probe at how the views distinguish force and content. What is the
difference between standing in the presenting-as-true relation to the content
that φ-ing is good and standing in the presenting-as-good relation to the
content φ? Extant attitudinal theories do not equip us with the resources
to explain this difference. This is no trivial matter since the distinction
is central to their explanation of the rational role of desire. Without an
explanation of the cash-value of the distinction, it is not clear that we have
a surer grip on the idea of attitudinal force than of how desires rationalise
intentions.
3.3.3 Taking Stock
Doxastic and perceptualist views face difficulties. Whilst basic desire’s recal-
citrance to normative belief favours perceptualist accounts, all content-based
formulations objectionably over-intellectualise the rational import of basic
desire. On the other hand, extant attitude-based formulations are not ade-
quately explanatory. To be clear, the problem raised does not compel one to
abandon attitude-based views altogether. Instead, it constitutes an invita-
tion for those who are sympathetic to the view to articulate a clear account
of what it is for a state to present content as ‘ought to be done’ in a way that
distinguishes it from the content-based formulations. The following section
takes up this task.
4 Desire as Attunement to Reasons
This section develops an explanation of basic desire’s rational significance by
appealing to the role desires play in facilitating responsiveness to apparent
reasons. The core idea is that occurrent basic desires play a role in deter-
mining our apparent reasons because our system of basic desires constitutes
a competence to recognize, and respond to, (a subset of) one’s normative
reasons for action.
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The view will be developed in two steps. The first step will be to explain
the idea of a ‘reasons-sensitive’ competence (section 4.1) and motivate the
suggestion that the conative system of which basic desires are a part com-
prise just such a reasons-sensitive competence (section 4.2). This requires
that we attend to the nature of the conative system at the sub-personal
level, the categorical basis of this competence. The second step explains
the operation of this system at the personal level, and describes how basic
desires shape one’s apparent reasons for action thereby affecting what it is
rational for one to do.
4.1 Desire and Reasons-Sensitive Competence
Our system of desires, I propose, constitutes a reasons-sensitive competence.
To unpack this, we need to say more about the notion of an apparent reason
before explaining the idea of a reasons-sensitive competence.
Apparent reasons contribute to explaining the rationality of actions. Ap-
parent reasons include facts of which one is aware that appear to favour
certain responses. But as many have pointed out (Parfit, 2011; Sylvan,
2014; Alvarez, 2018), apparent reasons also include considerations that are
‘merely apparent’ (Parfit, 2011, p. 35). In the case of factual error discussed
earlier, what A believes– viz. that the glass of amber liquid is beer– does
not obtain and so is not a fact that favours taking a sip. Nevertheless, given
A’s epistemic perspective, what she believes rationalises her taking a sip.
What are apparent reasons? Although still actively debated, I am sym-
pathetic to understanding apparent reasons as a function of competences
(Mantel, 2013; Sylvan, 2014; Kauppinen, 2019). Competences, like the skill
of the archer to hit her target, are dispositions of an agent to succeed at
a certain activity (Sosa, 2017, p. 72). A reasons-sensitive competence is a
disposition to succeed in acting in response to normative reasons; specifi-
cally, ‘to treat considerations like objective reasons to do φ-like things only
if they are objective [normative] reasons to do φ-like things’ (Sylvan, 2014,
p. 604) On competence-based views, an agent’s apparent reasons are states
of affairs that she is attracted to treat as a normative reason in virtue of
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such reasons-sensitive competences. The view explains why A acts ratio-
nally in cases of factual error: A acts rationally because she competently,
though incorrectly, treats what she believes as a reason.
Whilst credible, for present purposes I maintain only a weaker claim en-
tailed by competence-based views: that some apparent reasons are a func-
tion of reasons-sensitive competences. I will appeal to competences to ex-
plain how desires provide us with apparent reasons in a way that enables us
to avoid the problems of over-intellectualism. Indeed, the competence-based
view of Sylvan (2014)—in particular, the concept of ‘treating as a reason’—
is developed explicitly to avoid an over-intellectualised account of apparent
reasons.
With this in mind, the core idea to be pursued now is that:
Desire as Reasons-Sensitive Competence (DRC) the system of cona-
tion of which basic desires are a part constitutes a competence to
recognise a subset of normative reasons for action.
Two clarifications are needed. First, if DRC is true, then some consider-
ations we take to obtain are apparent reasons in virtue of our occurrent basic
desires. This is neutral with respect to the substantive issue in value the-
ory about whether normative reasons are desired-based. Following Schafer
(2013), I maintain an account that remains neutral on whether desires deter-
mine what one ‘objectively’ ought to do or what one has normative reason
to do. Second, it should be emphasised that our overall competence to ratio-
nally respond to reasons consists of a network of ‘local’ competences which,
inter alia, include the kind of competence DRC embodies (Kauppinen, 2019,
p. 13). Local competences ground a particular domain in which we are com-
petent reason-recognisers. For instance, the competence to see that proving
a certain mathematical theorem favours a certain kind of approach draws on
a competence that is developmentally distinct from perceptual competences
to form judgements about colour [ibid.].
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4.2 Proper Functionalism about Desire
To make the case for (DRC), it is necessary to look at the entire conative
system of which basic desires are a part, in particular, the underlying desire-
producing mechanisms (DPMs) that play a role in producing and regulating
our standing desires and, by extension, the occurrent basic desires that we
are disposed to have.4 This larger system constitutes the categorical basis or
‘seat’ (Sosa, 2017, p. 191) of the reasons-sensitive competence in question. I
propose a teleo-functional account of this system and explain how it improves
on the views considered in section 3.
4.2.1 Force and Function
Recall Schafer’s suggestion that desire rationalises intention because both
share ‘imperatival’ force; in this way, Schafer suggests that ‘desires play the
role of standard inputs into our processes of practical reasoning, [just as]
perceptual experiences play the role of standard inputs into our processes of
theoretical reasoning.’ (Schafer, 2013, 264, italics mine).
There is a natural way to capture Schafer’s idea within a functionalist
account of desire. We should think of occurrent basic desires as having a
functional role that is isomorphic with that of perceptual experiences.5 Both
are standard inputs not by virtue of being a reliable cause of intention and
belief respectively, but due to their having a nature such as to initiate inten-
tion and belief formation respectively. I suggest following the tradition that
appeals to functions (Millikan, 1984; Burge, 2003; Graham, 2012). Just as
perceptions are ‘standard’ inputs into processes that lead to belief formation
in virtue of sharing a core function— to represent veridically (Burge, 2003;
Burge, 2020)— occurrent basic desires are standard inputs into processes
that lead to intention in virtue of sharing a core function with intention.
4My focus on desire-producing mechanisms is inspired by important insights developed
in Stampe (1987).
5Obviously, by ‘isomorphic’, I do not mean that occurrent basic desires have an identical
functional role with (e.g., visual) perceptual experiences, only that they have a functional
role that mirrors each other in virtue of being coordinated by some overarching vertical
function (more shortly).
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The proposal is that we cash out parity of ‘force’ in terms of coordination
of function.6
The general notion of function that I employ is etiological : roughly, a
token x of type X has an etiological function to ψ if ancestral X’s having
previously ψ-ed explains why x now exists; for example, by explaining its
replication and proliferation (Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1984). For biological
phenomena, this explanation is one of the effect’s contribution to fitness
under natural selection. Following Millikan, call this a device’s biological or
proper function.
It is important to note that functional items may possess distinct func-
tions along distinct axes. For example, the human tongue possesses distinct
functions along the ‘horizontal’ axis to enable the performance of activities
like talking, tasting, swallowing, etc. (Graham, 2012, p. 458). A function on
the vertical axis is one that contributes to the performance of some function
on the horizontal axis. To illustrate, the tongue has the function to engage
in a particular backward rolling motion in coordination with the soft palate
to assist in discharging its function of swallowing food. Similarly, we can
talk of horizontal and vertical functions of the conative system to which
basic desires belong.
4.2.2 Functions: Horizontal and Vertical
With this in mind, I want to start by considering an overarching horizontal
function shared by basic desire-producing mechanisms (DPMs), standing
basic desires and occurrent basic desires.
Very plausibly, what explains the existence of our DPMs and, by exten-
sion, our standing and occurrent desires is their having historically moti-
vated subjects to do what is conducive to survival and reproduction. We
can sharpen this thought by identifying core biological functions of whole
organisms, such as eating, drinking, locomoting, foraging, fleeing, mating,
etc., all of which are key to explanations of reproductive success. A key hor-
izontal biological function of DPMs is to motivate the organism to realise
6This will require shifting to a variant of the functionalist view on which mental state
types are individuated, not by their causal roles, but by their teleofunctions (Sober, 1985).
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outcomes that conduce to the fulfilment of these core biological functions
under Normal conditions.
Let us turn now to vertical functions, starting with DPMs. DPMs per-
form their biological function by performing a key vertical function: to
produce and regulate standing desires in a certain manner that conduce to
the fulfilment of core biological functions. To see how, note that for func-
tional items in general, there is an etiological explanation of how producing
a certain effect ψ contributed to its proliferation. Millikan calls these ‘Nor-
mal’ (capitalised) explanations. For a functional item, a Normal explanation
specifies:
• Normal Functioning : how the item operated to produce the effect it
was selected for,
• Normal Constitution: the internal structure of the item when func-
tioning Normally, and
• Normal Conditions: conditions that obtain when it produced the effect
that it was selected for.
There is a range of accounts in the literature of the Normal functioning
and constitution of our DPMs. To take one, Tim Schroeder suggests that
DPMs produce and regulate our desires as a function of an agent’s stock of
standing desires in a process of contingency-based learning (Schroeder, 2004,
p. 66). I highlight two features of Schroeder’s view. First, we have innate
standing desires for objects that are reliably conducive to the fulfilment of
core biological functions; for example, desires for food, warmth, etc. Second,
DPMs produce novel desires based on their reward value, calculated as a
function of the agent’s motivational priors (Schroeder, 2004, p. 147). In this
way, we can see how DPMs produce and regulate desires that will retain an
indirect connection to the fulfilment of core biological functions.7
7Reference to Schroeder’s view is merely illustrative. For present purposes, we can be
neutral on the fine detail of this process provided that there is some mode of operation by
which DPMs produce and regulate standing desires to be good-conducive under Normal
conditions. The same points hold for rivals to Schroeder’s view (e.g., Butlin, 2017).
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Turning now to standing basic desires. As products of DPMs, standing
desires have the vertical function to interface with the subject’s cognitive or
sensory capacities to bring about occurrent basic desires. The details of the
kinds of conditions under which standing desires give rise to occurrent de-
sires is an empirical matter and depends on the nature of the standing desire
in question. For example, whilst appetitive standing desires interface, inter
alia, with the kinds of sensory capacities required for maintaining home-
ostasis, other standing desires (for sex, for example) will not. Given how
standing desires are regulated by DPMs when functioning and constituted
Normally, it should be clear how the fulfilment of this vertical function serves
to advance their horizontal biological function to motivate the agent to bring
about outcomes that satisfy core biological functions.
The final and most important piece in motivating DRC involves expli-
cating the Normal functioning of occurrent basic desires. Occurrent basic
desires, I claim, have the function to attune us to reasons. To illustrate
what this involves, consider passing through a food market when a punnet
of delicious, red, and plump strawberries catches your eye; at that moment,
you experience an attraction to eat those strawberries.
There are two elements involved in this that should be phenomenologi-
cally familiar: an attentional and motivational component.
The attentional component involves a disposition to have one’s atten-
tion exogenously drawn to some salient feature F of an outcome that one
represents (Scanlon, 1998, p. 34). For example, when one has the occurrent
desire to eat strawberries, one is disposed to have one’s attention continu-
ally drawn to features such as the plump, red flesh of the strawberries one
perceives, or to memories of the flavour of the strawberries.
The motivational component of an occurrent desire involves a ‘non-
alienating’ (Schroeder, 2007, p. 156) felt impulse to treat the item’s having
property F as favouring a certain response; that is, as a reason for a certain
response φ. To treat an attractant’s having property F as a reason to φ
is for the representation of the attractant’s being F to influence practical
reasoning by assigning some weight to the option of φ-ing. For example, in
virtue of one’s desire to eat strawberries, one feels an impulse to treat the
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fact that the strawberries have the appearance that they do as contributing
some weight to φ-ing in the course of determining what it is that one should
do.
Let us now bring all of these elements together.
According to (DRC), our conative system with its stock of standing
desires comprises a reasons-sensitive competence: a disposition to respond
to a subset of one’s normative reasons. The relevant reasons are prudential.
Here I assume that there are prudential reasons for agents to fulfil core
biological functions (to eat, drink, etc.). Our desire-regulating/producing
mechanisms (DPMs) constitute the basis of a competence to respond to such
reasons because they have the function to regulate an agent’s motivation in
prudentially good-conducive ways.
DPMs motivate action by producing standing desires for outcomes that
are, to varying degrees, related to the fulfilment of core biological functions.
Under certain triggering conditions, standing desires become occurrent. Oc-
current basic desires are manifestations of the reasons-sensitive competence
just as the archer’s shot is the manifestation of the archer’s skill. An occur-
rent basic desire to φ sustains an attraction to treat certain features F of
outcomes that we represent in perception or cognition as a reason to φ. I
suggest that this competent attraction to treat some feature F as a reason
is nothing short of one’s being presented with an apparent reason for action.
To have an occurrent basic desire, then, is a way of being attuned to one’s
reasons.
4.3 How do Basic Desires Contribute to What it is Rational
to Do?
We are now in a position to answer our central question head-on. To be in
the grip of an occurrent basic desire is for features within one’s perspective
to appear as apparent reasons for action. In acting on a desire, one acts for
the reason that the desire attunes one to. Desires contribute to what it is
rational to do by affecting an agent’s perspective on her apparent reasons
for action.
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How does the view here improve on the problems raised for extant guise-
of-the-good accounts of basic desire?
I will start with the problem of over-intellectualisation. On the account
developed here, basic desires are not beliefs about one’s location in the space
of reasons. When one responds to a basic desire to φ, one simply represents
the desideratum as having features that one is attracted to treat as a reason.
Following Sylvan (2014, pp. 601–2), ‘to treat P like an objective normative
reason to φ is to be disposed to respond to the appearance that P in. . . the
ways that would be favored if P were an objective normative reason to φ.’
When one responds to an occurrent basic desire to eat strawberries, for
example, one’s (apparent) reasons for eating the strawberries are facts like
the strawberries’ being plump and red, and not the fact that these properties
of the strawberries constitute reasons for one to eat them.
Moreover, we have explained how attitude-based perceptualist accounts
may employ the idea of coordination of function. Perceptions involve a
presentation of their objects ‘as true’ in the sense that they are states that
have the function to represent veridically. Analogously, basic desires involve
a presentation of their objects as normatively favoured in the sense that
they are states with the function to produce desires for outcomes that are
normatively favoured. Both are ‘standard’ inputs to belief- and intention-
forming processes respectively in virtue of sharing the relevant overarching
functions with those processes.
I end this section with a clarification concerning the conditions under
which desires rationalise action. One might object that my view objec-
tionably lowers the bar for rational responsiveness because it misclassifies
non-rational responses to a basic desire as rational. For example, one could
absent-mindedly act on a desire for coffee, competently treating relevant
features of one’s perceived environment as a reason to act in a certain way.
This objection, however, fails to account for an important qualification. De-
sires defeasibly rationalise actions only given certain enabling conditions,
specifically when one is suitably sensitive to conditions that would diminish
reasons that there are to pursue the desired course of action. Here there
is parity with visual perception, which rationalises perceptual judgements
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against certain enabling conditions; for instance, causal sensitivity to ambi-
ent lighting conditions.
5 Conclusion
This paper has focussed on how to explain the simple thought that occurrent
basic desires are capable of rationalising intention and action.
Extant guise-of-the-good accounts face one of two problems: either they
cannot explain the recalcitrance of occurrent basic desires to cognitive eval-
uations, or they over-intellectualise how basic desires rationalise action. On
the view that I defend, our desire-producing mechanisms comprise part of
our competence to recognise and respond to normative reasons in virtue of
their biological function. Occurrent basic desires, I argue, are manifestations
of this reasons-sensitive competence and play a role in providing one with
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